We de ne a notion of Kripke logical predicate for models of classical linear logic.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to prove a denotational completeness result for linear logic as in 4], but by di erent, more traditional tools of denotational semantics, namely logical predicates of \varying arity" aka Kripke logical predicates. These were introduced originally by A. Jung and J. Tiuryn in 6] for the purpose of characterising those set theoretic functions which are de nable in typed {calculus (for arbitrary interpretations of the base type).
It is more or less folklore how to adapt the methods of 6] in order to characterise the {de nable morphisms for models in arbitrary cartesian closed category C . The key idea is to consider logical predicates in b V, the category of presheaves over the category V of variable substitutions in C 2 , and then to show that the {de nable generalised elements form such a Kripke logical predicate.
The purpose of this paper is to adapt the Jung{Tiuryn technique to Classical Linear Logic (CLL) by identifying an appropriate notion of Kripke logical predicate for it. For an arbitrary model C of classical linear logic we charac- A] ] C where B ranges over certain \well-behaved" sets of generalised elements of ?] ] C . Notice that \generalised" elements of A are objects of A \relative to an arbitrary context" whereas \global" elements of A are those elements of A \relative to the empty context".
Our Kripke logical predicates P B appear as particular instances of the more general notion introduced recently in 5] for ILL (Intuitionistic Linear Logic). However, making intrinsic use of linear negation typical for CLL our restricted class of Kripke logical predicates can be de ned in a simpler way appearing as a proof-relevant version of Girard's phase semantics for linear logic as in 3] (where our \well-behaved" B ?] ] C correspond to the arbitrary subsets of the monoid in loc.cit.). As phase semantics is already \built-in" to our approach we can avoid adding it as an additional component as in 4].
In section 2 we de ne our notion of Kripke logical predicate for arbitrary models of CLL (without quanti ers). In section 3 we show soundness, i.e. that proof objects satisfy all logical predicates under consideration. In section 4 we show denotational completeness, i.e. that every element satisfying all Kripke logical predicates appears as the denotation of some derivation. In particular we show that for every type A we have Pr(A) = P Pr(?) (A) where for arbitrary formulas C the set Pr(C) consists of those generalised elements of C appearing as denotations of derivations. In section 5 we sketch how our characterisation of proof objects can be used to build denotationally complete models where every type contains only proof objects. Finally, in section 5 we compare our proof method with the original one of 4] and discuss the relevance of our achievements.
We think that our proof of denotational completeness|besides its simplicity| provides a new, though not unexpected link between traditional techniques of denotational semantics and linear logic in the sense that methods of the former may be fruitfully applied to the study of the latter. Although the skeleton of our proof follows quite closely the pattern of 6], or rather its adaptation to general models as given by ccc's, the esh around this skeleton is fresh as we have to de ne a new notion of Kripke logical predicate for Classical Linear Logic which amounts to a \proof{relevant" version of Girard's phase semantics. Moreover, our proofs are not just a straightforward adaptation of those of 6] as the basic ingredients of classical linear logic are fairly di erent from typed {calculus.
Kripke Logical Predicates
In this section we de ne a notion of Kripke logical predicate for models of quanti er-free classical linear logic referred to simply as \linear logic" for the rest of this paper. Readers not feeling at ease with general categorical models of linear logic may well think of their favourite concrete model, for example the coherence space model of 3], without missing anything essential. For a precise de nition of categorical model for Linear Logic see 7] or rather the corrected version in 2] (though the di erence is not relevant for our purposes as we do not consider equality of proof terms).
For ease of exposition we sometimes employ a 2{sided sequent calculus for linear logic because this does not make any di erence w.r.t. the interpretation of derivations, the so{called \proof objects". Accordingly, we distinguish between left contexts ?`and right contexts`? which are interpreted di erently De nition 1 Let C be the underlying category of a model of linear logic, e.g. the category of coherence spaces and linear maps, and V be the subcategory of C whose objects are denotations of left contexts of linear logic and whose morphisms are denotations of proofs using only the structural rules of weakening, contraction 3 
where prom(a) = !(a) !? for a 2 GE(A)(!?) (where : ! ! ! ! is the comultiplication of the comonad !) and prom(a) is unde ned if the stage of a is not a banged context, i.e. not of the form !?. 6 The following properties are easily established for arbitrary P B . Notice that from now on we often write f(a) for ev (f a) whenever f 2 GE(A(B) and a 2 GE(A).
Lemma 6 PROOF. Claim (1) is obvious from the de nition of P B .
For ( 
Claim (4) is immediate from (3) as GE(A B(C) = GE(A(B(C).
For (5) f(prom(a))(b) 2 B for all b 2 P B (B ? ) and a 2 P B (A), i.e., i f(prom(a)) 2 P B (B) for all a 2 P B (A).
For (6) Notice that by (2) and (3) of the previous lemma 6 we get that our notion of Kripke logical predicate conservatively extends the usual one for simply typed -calculus (as intuitionistic application is a particular case of linear application.
Notice also that our Kripke logical predicates are instances of M. Hasegawa's notion of Kripke logical predicates for models of intuitionistic linear logic as described in 5] 7 . However, we de ne Kripke logical predicates for the full quanti er-free part of classical linear logic where the presence of an involutive linear negation allows for considerable simpli cations.
Soundness
In this section we prove that proof objects, i.e. global elements of the form ]], satisfy all Kripke logical predicates. In the next section we show the reverse inclusion.
Before we embark on the proof of the soundness theorem we introduce a notational convention that will prove useful in the sequel. PROOF. Let B be a stable subset of GE(?). We proceed by induction on structure of derivation . From Lemma 6(3) it follows that id A 2 P B (A(A) as for all a 2 P B (A) we have that id A (a) = a 2 P B (A).
( The proof for the right introduction rule is analogous. PROOF. The proof is by induction on the structure of A.
First notice that Pr(A) = P Pr(?) (A) entails Pr(A ? ) = P Pr(?) (A ? ) as we have Pr(A ? ) = Pr(A) ? P r(?) by Lemma 8(2) and P Pr(?) (A) ? P r(?) = P Pr(?) (A ? ) by Lemma 6(1). Notice that this observation reduces the number of cases to be considered to the half.
As for the purposes of this proof we consider no other B than Pr(?) there is no danger of confusion when writing ( ) ? instead of ( ) ? P r(?) to improve readability.
(?) Pr(?) = P Pr(?) (?) by de nition of P Pr(?) . ( ) Suppose as induction hypothesis that Pr(A i ) = P Pr(?) ( Up to now we have used \biorthogonal closed Kripke logical predicates" for characterising \proof objects", i.e. those global elements of types that arise as interpretations of formal derivations. As usual one may adapt such a characterisation into a construction of a denotationally complete model (as was done also by J.-Y. Girard in 4]). Although for this purpose we might start with an arbitrary model C of linear logic, however, for reasons of concreteness we further assume that C is the widely known coherence space model described e.g. in 3]. Again we write V for the (non-full) sub-category of C of variable substitutions between (denotations) of contexts.
De nition 11 Let M be the category which is de ned as follows. An object of M is a pair A = (jAj; P(A)) where jAj is a coherence space and P(A) is a family indexed by stable subsets B of GE(?) such that P(A) B is a Kripke logical predicate on jAj of kind B. A morphism in M from A to B is a linear map f : jAj ! jBj such that f a 2 P(B) B for all stable B GE(?) and a 2 P(A) B .
This category M can be endowed with the structure of a model of linear logic using that C itself is a model of linear logic and constructing the Kripke logical predicates as described in De nition 5. The required morphisms are constructed as in C and turn out to preserve all the required Kripke logical relations due to the Soundness Theorem 7. Notice that this model M is not extensional although it is denotationally complete. This situation is comparable to the situation in game semantics where one constructs \intensionally full abstract models" that are not extensional though all morphism in the model arise as interpretations of terms. One might try to remedy this situation by restricting the coherence spaces to those elements which are invariant under all Kripke logical relations but, unfortunately, these restrictions are not coherence spaces anymore. 8 
Discussion
We consider our characterisation of proof objects via Kripke logical predicates for arbitrary models of linear logic as an alternative to J.-Y. Girard's characterisation of proof objects in the coherence space model using }{monoids combined with ordinary phase semantics, see 4]. His characterisation of proof objects is absolutley syntax{free whereas in our account we make essential use of the category V of variable substitutions which might be regarded as a \very faint shadow of syntax". But V is so trivial compared to the collection of all proof objects that we think it is not mere cheating what we achieved. However, as a reward for \cheating a bit" when using V we gain the following advantages.
Firstly, our proof of completeness is fairly simple compared to Girard's rather complicated construction of an appropriate }{monoid in his paper \On Denotational Completeness" 4] . Moreover, our methode works for arbitrary 9 models of linear logic and not only for the coherence space model.
Secondly, we perfectly can avoid considering an additional phase semantics component as this appears to be \built in" already. Namely, if A is a coherence space with an empty web 10 then in Girard's approach for every }{monoid P there is only the empty clique in P}A which forces him to add an ordinary monoid M providing the phase semantics component needed to distinguish those empty cliques which are proof objects from the empty cliques that don't arise as interpretations of proofs. In our approach there is no need for this as denotational facts of an A with empty web are simply (in obvious 1-1-correspondence with) certain sets of contexts as GE(A) = jVj if jAj = ;. In particular, under this identi cation a denotational B{fact of A is nothing but a fact w.r.t. the monoid of contexts (under concatenation) with ? := B. 8 When constructing fully abstract models of PCF this methods works because the closure of a subset of cpo is a cpo again provided it contains the least element. Unfortunately, coherence spaces are not so robust under taking substructures. 9 as e.g. Chu spaces or dePaiva's Dialectica categories 10 as e.g. those of the form A >, A 0, A}> and A}0
Finally, notice that in the sense of \logical complexity" our characterisation of proof objects in the coherence space model by some sort of invariants does not provide \simpler" characterisation than the obvious one as syntactic denablity which, obviously, is an r.e. condition on nite cliques whereas ours is of much higher logical complexity. Nevertheless, a characterisation of syntactic de nablity by invariants may be considered as more \elegant" in the sense that one \avoids any reference to syntax". But this is a merely aesthetic criterion which probably cannot be given a precise mathematical meaning. In particular, the achievements of denotational completeness do not seem to throw any light on the following question Is it decidable whether a clique in the coherence space model comes from a proof ?
Full completness results of another avour have been obtained e.g. in A. M. Tan's PhD Thesis 8] where it is proved that every dinatural transformation on an arbitrary model of multiplicative linear logic (MLL), as e.g. in particular the coherence space model, appears as denotation of a proof in MLL. As all denotations of derivations in MLL give rise to dinatural transformations these are precisely the proof objects of MLL. Alas, this doesn't give any handle on the question above as dinatural transformations are inherently in nite objects and, furthermore, it is not clear how to extend her results to all linear connectives, in particular the exponentials. However, a comparison and integration of both approaches is a topic worthwhile for future investigation.
